Carving Mental Disorders at the Joints

(12.02.08) Is it possible to determine the classification of mental disorders by
objective, empirical science alone, or must psychiatric nosology forever
reflect particular moral and social values?

 

Is it possible to determine the classification of mental disorders by objective, empirical science alone, or must psychiatric nosology forever reflect particular moral and social values? In my dissertation, I will argue that empirical objectivity in psychiatric classification is possible in principle, and that mental disorders can be identified with natural kinds. To see this, we must first replace a conception of natural kinds suited for entities in the physical sciences with a more relaxed conception suited for theoretical purposes in the life sciences.
Mental disorders, I will then argue, can be carved at the joints if the human
mind is built up of "modules" or "mechanisms" with distinct proper
functions; these mental modules can be caused to malfunction in particular
ways, particular malfunctions cause particular clusters of symptoms, and
particular clusters of symptoms constitute properties which can be
projected onto other individuals who suffer from the same kind of
disorder. Objectivity in nosology comes not without a price, however.
Using the example of depression, I will argue that there is likely to be a
significant lack of overlap between normative, clinical concepts and
descriptive, pathological concepts. Against the doctrine of evaluationism,
which says that disorder status should ultimately be determined by our
values, I will maintain that the concept of disorder is an objective,
value-free one, referring to biological malfunctions. We should accept
that there may be problematic mental conditions that we would like to
treat, but which nevertheless do not constitute mental disorders.
Moreover, it is not a priori impossible that being mentally disordered may
have positive effects. Mental health may not always be a goal worth
striving for.

Publikasjoner:

Hovedoppgave /Cand. Philol. Thesis:

Artikler i tidsskrifter / articles in journals
"Hyperaktiv adferd: En sykdom som alle andre?" Filosofisk supplement
1/2007 (Adferd).