Emotions and Objectivity - The Metaethical Implications of Moral Psychology

Andreas Carlsson
Foto: Hæge Håtveit

My doctoral dissertation explores the relationship between emotions and morality. The project is structured around two questions. First, is there a necessary connection between moral evaluation and emotions? Second, if morality has its root in human emotions, what bearing does this have on the question of moral objectivity?
In order to address the first question I focus on new evidence from empirical research on psychology, suggesting a strong link between emotions and moral evaluation. I also discuss the issue of motivational internalism: is it a requirement on genuine moral judgments that the speaker is motivated to act in accordance with her judgment?
The second part of the thesis deals with moral objectivity. The role of emotions in moral judgments has been taken to imply either a) that moral judgments cannot be true or b) that the truth of these judgments is dependent on the emotions we happen to have. I argue against both these claims. The aim of the thesis is to reconcile a realistic moral psychology with a satisfactory notion of moral objectivity.